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INTRODUCTION

June 6, 1996, Melissa Drexler, an eighteen year old high school

senior at Lacey Township High School in New Jersey, attended
her high school prom. Her prom experience, however, was
markedly different from that of her classmates. Drexler, a 5-foot-7-inch,
130 pound girl who no one knew was pregnant, allegedly delivered a newborn baby in a bathroom stall during the prom.' She then presumably
cleaned herself, rejoined her classmates, and danced to a song she personally requested of the disk jockey. Later, a janitor found blood in the
bathroom and a dead baby boy's body in a trash can. 2 An autopsy revealed that the baby was born alive and died of suffocation. 3 Drexler,
indicted for murder, now awaits trial. 4 Although prosecutors are not
seeking the death penalty, Drexler could face up to thirty years in prison. 5
While factually unique, Melissa Drexler's story is not isolated. Less
than two weeks before Drexler allegedly murdered her infant, a seventeen year old Pennsylvania girl gave birth to an infant, and hid it in her
gym bag for a two-hour ride home. 6 Upon arriving home, the mother left
the gym bag in the garage, and the baby died of asphyxia. The infant's
mother, Melissa Seaner, pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sen1.

See Charges Weighed Against Woman Who DiscardedHer Newborn at Prom, CHI.

TRIB., June 10, 1997, at 10; see also Dateline: Death at the Prom (NBC television broadcast,
June 29, 1997).
2. See Now Prom Mom Stands Indicted, NEWSDAY, Sept. 18, 1997, at A50.
3. See id.
4. See The Today Show: New Jersey Teen Accused of Killing Newborn Not Eligible
for Death Penalty (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 18, 1997). Drexler's trial was set to
begin on January 20, 1998, in Monmouth County, New Jersey. See Judge Won't Relocate
Trial of Prom Teen in Baby Death, THE RECORD (Northern New Jersey), Jan. 17, 1998, at
A3. Drexler's attorneys unsuccessfully argued a request to change venue, however, the
motion postponed the trial. See id. No new trial date has been set. See id.
5. See The Today Show, supra note 4.
6. See Brendan Schurr, Teen-age Mother Admits Slaying Newborn Was Found Dead
in Gym Bag in Garage of Home, PrSBURGH-POsT GAZETTE, Aug. 12, 1997, at A16.
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tenced to four years in prison. 7
Homicidal mothers are not all teenagers. For example, in 1995, Dr.
Deborah Green, a mature Kansas City medical doctor and suburban
housewife, set fire to her house with her children still inside. 8 Dr. Green,
who never questioned the condition of her children until more than an
hour after firefighters arrived, was adjudged guilty of murder. 9 Another
example is Susan Smith, the South Carolina woman who begged the nation to help her find her two abducted boys. The country was stunned to
find that there was no abductor; Susan Smith had driven her children into
a lake.' 0
While there are no clear answers to why mothers kill their children,
there is also no clear, coherent approach to their punishment. In fact, few
guidelines exist in our justice system to respond to an infanticidal mother.
Part II of this Comment defines the crime of infanticide and traces its
lengthy development. Part III introduces current and asserted possible
for defenses to the crime for mentally impaired, murderous mothers. The
Comment discusses disparate sentencing and incoherent treatment in
Part IV. Finally, Part V covers modern infanticide issues, and Part VI
evaluates possible solutions to the dilemmas posed by the treatment of
homicidal mothers.
II.

A.

THE CRIME OF INFANTICIDE

DEFINING HUMAN INFANTICIDE AND THE INFANTICIDAL MOTHER

Although "human infanticide" has been defined in a variety of ways, it
is generally understood to mean the murder of a child under the age of
discretion." Despite the fact that the term "infanticide" implies the murder of an infant, no bright-line age rule exists. Neonaticide, the only type
of infanticide that fits a bright-line age test, defines cases where infants
are murdered within twenty-four hours after birth. 12 Unambiguous, how7. See John Curran, 4 Years for Teen Who Let Baby Die, THE RECORD (Northern
New Jersey), Oct. 24, 1997, at A2. Seaner could be eligible for parole in over nine months.
See id. At the hearing, the judge rejected Seaner's claims that the pregnancy resulted from
rape, and thus, that Seaner suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. See id.; see also
Marie McCullough, Profile of Mothers Who Dump Babies Changing U.S., THE DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 6, 1997, at 45A.
8. See Mark Anderson, Green's Crimes Shatter Suburban Veneer, KANSAS CITY
STAR, Apr. 27, 1996, at 1.
9. See Tony Rizzo, Investigators Seeing More Parents Who Kill, Setting Fire to Murder
Can Be Motivated by Anything, They Say, KANSAS CITv STAR, Apr. 19, 1996, at A20.
10. See generally Janet Ford, Note, Susan Smith and Other Homicidal Mothers-In
Search of the Punishment That Fits the Crime, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 521 (1996); Rick
Bragg, CarolinaJury Rejects Execution for Woman Who Drowned Sons, N.Y. TIMES, July
29, 1995, at A4; Christopher Sullivan, "Something Went Wrong"--Town in S.C. Baffled,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Nov. 5, 1994, at 1A.
11. See PETER C. HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, MURDERING MOTHERS: INFANTICIDE IN
ENGLAND AND NEW ENGLAND 1558-1803 xiii (1981). In Tudor homicide trials, the age of
discretion was eight years old; other definitions used nine years old. See id.
12. Dr. Phillip Resnick has specifically defined neonaticide as the killing of a newborn
child on the day of its birth. See Phillip J. Resnick, Murder of a Newborn: A Psychiatric
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ever, is the fact that infanticide laws have pertained only to women, from
the inception of the term. 13 Infanticide can include any of the following
behaviors: deliberate killing, placing the child in a dangerous situation
with little hope of survival, lowered levels of support, "accidents," and
14
excessive physical punishment.
An infanticidal mother is more problematic to define than the crime
itself because homicidal mothers do not fit a specific profile. While homicidal mothers are often young, uneducated, immature, and victims of
abuse, cases in which mature, educated, non-abused mothers kill are also
common. In fact, some homicidal mothers kill the children they so desperately sought to conceive. 15
B.

HISTORY OF INFANTICIDE

"If we are surprised by the idea of a mother extinguishing the very life
she brought into being, that is because 'we have very little sense of history."' 16 The historical presence of infanticide is alarming. In the early
modern English courts, twenty-five percent of all murder cases were infanticides. 17 Ancient Greeks killed weak, deformed, or unwanted children.1 8 The Chinese and Indians often did not let female infants survive
in order to maintain a more favorable male to female ratio. 19 Undesired
Brazilian infants were left under trees; 20 Eskimos left babies out in the
snow. 21 In fact, the crime of infanticide has roots dating back to GrecoRoman antiquity, where deformed infants often fell victim to infanticide
in order to better society, and parents were generally not prohibited from
22
killing their own children.
Review of Neonaticide, 126 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1414 (1970). For purposes of this Com-

ment, the term infanticide will also encompass neonaticide.
13. See Katherine O'Donovan, The Medicalisationof Infanticide, 1984 CRIM. L. REV.

259.
14. See GLENN HAUSFATER & SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, INFANTICIDE:
AND EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES 442 (1984).

COMPARATIVE

15. "It happens in families where there's no history of violence and where there's a
long history of violence. It crosses racial lines [and] socioeconomic lines ....It's a horror
that we as a society are going to be confronted with again and again." David Van Biema,
Parents Who Kill, TIME, Nov. 14, 1994, at 50 (quoting Robert Hazelwood, a former FBI

behavioral scientist).
16. Suzanne Cassidy, Mothers Killing Their Kids "Old and Shocking and Awful", SUNDAY PATRIOT NEWS (Harrisburg, PA), May 21, 1995, at B8 (quoting Daniel Maier-Katkin,
infanticide expert and Dean of the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Florida
State University).
17. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 11, at xviii. In seventeenth-century Plymouth,
Massachusetts, a woman was executed for the murder of her infant. Three of eleven executions for infanticide during this period in Massachusetts involved women. Also, 90% of
all murderous assaults by women were directed at infants. See id.
18. See HAUSFATER & HRDY, supra note 14, at 439.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See Cynthia Bouillon-Jensen, History of Infanticide, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BIOETHICS 1200 (Warren Thomas Reich ed., 1995). In fact, Roman fathers had mortal
power of their children and were even allowed to execute a grown son. See JOHN Bos-
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The crime of infanticide is also present in religious history. Among the
first to condemn the killing of infants were the Jewish scholars. 23 Around
the fourth century, church leaders from Christian religions pressured
their leaders to enact laws protecting newborns, representing perhaps the
first true opposition to infanticide.24 Despite the changes, infanticide was
not recognized as legal homicide until the Middle Ages.2 5 One striking
point of the Medieval period's recognition of homicide was the emergence of acquittals for married women on pleas of insanity or poverty.2 6
"By law it was considered a serious crime, yet in practice it was generally
27
excused. "
Motive gained importance during the Renaissance period of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which witnessed an increase in infanticide cases.28 The law created a presumption that a child was born alive
unless a mother could rebut the presumption.2 9 Motive was often the
deciding factor. Pleaded motives included temporary insanity, dissociation, and even depression during labor and delivery. 30 The most noted
motive involved mothers trying to conceal illegitimate children. 3 1 Regarding the motive of insanity, madness was often asserted not to excuse
a mother, but rather to avert the death penalty. 32 "Temporary insanity
was neither a defense nor a road to pardon in the seventeenth century,
but in the next 100 years it gradually became a successful plea to a charge
'33
of infanticide.
The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries generally brought greater leniency on infanticidal mothers. Juries more readily accepted new defenses such as "benefit of linen" and "want of help. ' 34 The "benefit of
WELL, THE KINDNESS OF STRANGERS: THE ABANDONMENT OF CHILDREN IN WESTERN
EUROPE FROM LATE ANTIQUITY TO THE RENAISSANCE 58-59 (1988).

23. See Bouillon-Jensen, supra note 22, at 1201. Jews believed that human life was
sacred from the moment of birth. See id.; see also IAN BROCKINGTON, MOTHERHOOD AND
MENTAL HEALTH 430-31 (1996).
24. See id. Constantine, the first Christian emperor, issued the first secular law concerning the killing of children. See id.; see also R. Kumar & Maureen Marks, Infanticide
and the Law of England and Wales, inPOSTPARTUM PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS, A PICTURE
PUZZLE 258 (James A. Hamilton & Patricia N. Harberger eds., 1992). For a further historical background, see id. at 257-72.
25. See Bouillon-Jansen, supra note 22, at 1202.
26. See Catherine Damme, Infanticide: The Worth of an Infant Under Law, 22 MEDICAL HISTORY 1-24 (1978). Unmarried mothers found guilty of infanticide, on the other
hand, were accused of being witches and punished severely. See Bouillon-Jensen, supra
note 22, at 1202.
27. Bouillon-Jensen, supra note 22, at 1202.
28. See id. at 1203.
29. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 11, at 146.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 145. This motive, however, cannot be the sole reason because 95% of
illegitimate children were not killed and older, legitimate children sometimes were. See id.
32. See id. at 146. Courts also asked pardons for lunatics and others incompetent since
birth. See id.
33. Id. In 1668, a woman fell into a temporary frenzy, killed her infant, and later
confessed. Her marital state and honest reputation led the jury to accept her claim of
temporary insanity. See id. at 146-47.
34. See Bouillon-Jensen, supra note 22, at 1204.
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linen" defense almost guaranteed acquittal based on the presumption
that if a woman had made linen for her baby before the baby's birth, she
lacked the intent to kill. 35 The "want of help" plea was more vague, using
falls, accidents, unheeded cries for help, and illness to effectively sway
jurors. 36 Thus, the use of defenses by accused infanticidal mothers is not
a new development.
C.

ENGLAND'S INFANTICIDE

AcT

England is the forerunner among countries that statutorily recognize
and favor mothers who kill their young children for psychological reasons. The popular belief among the English that a woman capable of
killing her baby necessarily suffered from a medical disorder was codified
in England's Infanticide Act of 1922. 37 The Act of 1922 was too ambigu-

ous, however, necessitating a new or amended law. 38 The Infanticide Act
of 1938 resolved these ambiguities, stating:
Where a woman by any wilful act or omission causes the death of her
child under the age of twelve months, but at the time of the act or
omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not
fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child,
she is by statute guilty of the offence of infanticide even though but
for the statute the offence would have been murder. The punishment 39is as if the woman had been guilty of manslaughter of the
child.
This Act continues to be the law in England today. 40 England's Infantiare ill if they kill their infants within
cide Act presumes that all women
41
the first twelve months of life.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See Infanticide Act of 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, ch. 18, § 1(1). The Act stated:
Where any woman by any willful act or omission caused the death of her
newborn child, but at the time of the act or omission she had not fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to such child, and by reason thereof the
balance of her mind was disturbed, she shall, notwithstanding that the circumstances were such that but for this Act the offence would have amounted
to murder, be guilty of a felony, to wit of infanticide and may for such offence be dealt with and punished as if she had been guilty of the offence of
manslaughter of that child.
Id.
38. The Infanticide Act of 1922 failed to define "newly-born" child; therefore, there
was no stipulated limit. See Kumar & Marks, supra note 24, at 262.
39. Infanticide Act of 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 36, § 1(1).
40. See Gary Slapper, Mothers and Madness; Law, THE TIMES OF LONDON, Mar. 19,
1996, available in 1996 WL 6482063. See generally Daniel Maier Katkin & Robbin Ogle, A
Rationalefor Infanticide Laws, 1993 CRIM. L. REV. 903. For additional discussion of British history on treatment of infanticide cases, see Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill:
Coming to Terms with Modern American Infanticide, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 7-18 (1996).
41. "The infanticide law assures a link between childbirth and lactation ... and disturbance and balance of mind, but it does not require proof of any physiological basis for
either the offence or for the occurrence of illness." Kumar & Marks, supra note 24, at 269.
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D.

INFANTICIDE'S DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN LAW

American courts historically were very harsh in their treatment of infanticide. The Puritans considered it a greater sin to destroy illegitimate
children than to birth them. 42 By 1692, Massachusetts mandated death
for any woman who murdered an illegitimate child. 43 Many women lost
their lives as a consequence of this law presuming guilt, while other
criminals, guilty of more defined crimes, escaped death."4 "Now that
birth control is more or less routine, infanticide seems an unrelated and
horrifying event; but to colonial women, who had no alternative and
whose offspring were very likely to die in infancy anyway, infanticide
might be a desperate kind of birth control after the fact. ' '45
Unlike England, infanticide in America generally is not considered a
separate class of crime. Infanticidal mothers, therefore, usually are
charged under murder or manslaughter statutes. Because American
mothers in most jurisdictions lack a presumption of mental illness, evidence of mental illness must be asserted and proven in order to escape or
mitigate harsh sentences. By using only general homicide statutes, one
leading commentator has observed that "[A]merican society lacks a conscious awareness of infanticide as a domestic problem. '46
III.

THE ROLE OF INSANITY AS A DEFENSE
A.

INSANITY TESTS IN AMERICA

In the United States, courts have historically utilized one of the following tests to determine insanity: the M'Naghten Test; the "irresistible impulse" test; the American Law Institute's (ALl) Model Penal Code test;
or other tests such as the "product" or Durham test, and the federal stat47
utory definition test.
First, many courts continue to adhere to the M'Naghten rule for insanity. The rule determines whether defendants knew and understood
the nature and quality of their acts, and if they did know, whether they
knew that what they were doing was wrong. 48 The rule has consistently
42. See ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL 44 (1980).
43. See id. at 45. Under this law, any woman who concealed the death of her illegitimate child, whether born alive or not, was to suffer death unless one witness could prove it
was born dead. See id.
44. See id. at 49-50. Moreover, the Puritans believed: "Murder an unbaptized infant
•.. and you murder its soul, for the unbaptized have no place in heaven." Id. at 50.
45. Id. at 51.
46. Oberman, supra note 40, at 20.
47. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 316 (2d ed. 1995). A
few jurisdictions do not provide a general insanity defense. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-207
(1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04.1-0 (1985);
UTAH CODE ArNNr.§ 76-2-305 (Supp. 1990).

48. See M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843)
(Full Reprint).
That to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was
laboring under such defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
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faced criticism because it fails to define "know," fails to recognize degrees
of incapacity, relies heavily on expert testimony, and is generally viewed
as outdated.49 A final criticism, vigorously argued for mothers suffering
from postpartum depression, is that the test is too narrow to accommodate undeterrable homicidal mothers to whom punishment would be
inappropriate.50
The M'Naghten test has sometimes been used, albeit unsuccessfully, to
decide insanity claims of mothers accused of murdering their infants. For
instance, it was used to analyze the insanity claim of Heather Clark, who
wrapped her baby in a blanket and abandoned it in the desert.5 1 At
Clark's trial for attempted murder, two psychiatrists and one psychologist
testified that Clark suffered from severe postpartum depression, rendering her legally insane at the time of the crime.5 2 The jury weighed the
evidence and determined that, under the M'Naghten test, Clark knew the
nature and quality of her acts and had the capacity to determine right
53
from wrong when she committed the crime.
Another example of an infanticidal mother being adjudged guilty
under the M'Naghten test is found in the case of Commonwealth v.
Reilly. 54 In this case, the defendant-mother refused to admit that she was
pregnant because she feared eviction from the house where she was staying.5 5 After giving birth alone, Reilly killed her baby by inflicting blows
to its head and body. 56 Two mental health experts testified that she "did
not know the nature and quality of her act," did not know her acts were
wrong, and had suffered a brief reactive psychosis. 57 Although this testimony suggested insanity under M'Naghten, further testimony indicated
that the psychosis developed after the birth and that Reilly was "in touch
with reality" at the time of the killing. 58 Reilly was found guilty of third
degree murder and sentenced to a prison term of not less than thirty-six
59
months but no more than ten years.
A second test for determining insanity, known as the "irresistible impulse" test, broadened M'Naghten by adding a third prong requiring volitional capacity. 60 Basically, the "rule requires a verdict of not guilty by
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it,
that he did not know what he was doing was wrong.
Id.

49. See

DRESSLER, supra

note 47, at 320-21.

50. See id. at 321.
51. See Clark v. State, 588 P.2d 1027 (Nev. 1979).
52. See id. at 1028. Cross-examination revealed that Clark had only been examined by
the psychologist after the attempted murder; the psychiatrists examined her over a year
later. See id.
53. See id. There was substantial evidence to support the jury's conclusion. See id.
54. 549 A.2d 503 (Pa. 1988).
55. See id. at 504.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 505.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See DRESSLER, supra note 47, at 321. Professor Dressier states the test thus:
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reason of insanity if it is found that the defendant had a mental disease
[that] kept [her] from controlling [her] conduct. '6 1 Although popular at
its inception, the "irresistible impulse" test faces many of the same criticisms as M'Naghten. 62 Perhaps due to this criticism, the "irresistible im63
pulse" test was never followed by a majority of states.
The American Law Institute Test (Model Penal Code Test) is a revised
version of the M'Naghten test and the "irresistible impulse" test. The
ALl test states that a person who has a mental defect or disease at the
time of the offense is not responsible for the offense if she lacked substantial capacity to: (1) "appreciate the criminality ...of [her] conduct;" or
'64
(2) "to conform [her] conduct to the requirements of law."
The Product (Durham) Test is another test used, in part, to determine
insanity. 65 This test excuses a defendant's conduct by reason of insanity if
her unlawful act was the product of a mental disease or defect. 66 The
Product Test is premised on the New Hampshire case of State v. Pike.67
No state adheres to the Product Test today, but it continues to have an
impact on the insanity debate.
In 1984, the United States Congress enacted a statutory definition of
insanity known as the "federal" test for insanity. This federal law excuses
a defendant if, "at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the
offense, . . . as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, [she] was
unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of [her]
acts."'68 The defendant must prove her incapacity by clear and convincing
69
evidence.
[A] person is insane if, at the time of the offense: (1) she acted from an
irresistible and uncontrollable impulse; (2) she lost the power to choose between the right and wrong, and to avoid the act in question, as that [her] free
agency was at the time destroyed; or (3) the [defendant's] will ... has been
otherwise than voluntarily so completely destroyed that [her] actions are not
subject to it, but are beyond [her] control.
Id. (citations omitted).
61. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSTIN W. ScoTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 320 (2d ed. 1986).
62. For a discussion of the criticisms, see generally DRESSLER, supra note 47, at 321-22;

see also LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 61, at 321-22.
63. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 61, at 320 n.95.
64. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1995). The rule not only expresses a broader construction of M'Naghten by substituting the word "appreciate" for "know," but the rule also
uses the word "conform" to avoid any implication of irresistible impulse. See JOHN
KAPLAN & ROBERT WEISBERG, CRIMINAL LAW 901 (2d ed. 1991).
65. The D.C. Circuit created the Durham Test, but it is no longer used in that court.
See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled by United States v.
Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
66. See DRESSLER, supra note 47, at 323.
67. 49 N.H. 339 (1869); see LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 61, at 323-24. Although it
never officially adopted the Product Test, New Hampshire continues to adhere to the idea
that even if a defendant is found guilty, the unlawful act may not have resulted from that
mental illness; therefore, the defendant is criminally responsible for the act. See State v.
Abbott, 503 A.2d 791, 794 (N.H. 1985).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1994).
69. See 18 U.S.C. § 17(b) (1994).
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A FINDING OF GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL

Twelve states have adopted a guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) verdict as
an alternative to the insanity defense. 70 A GBMI verdict ensures that the
defendant receives the penal sentence that would be imposed if she were
71
found guilty; however, psychiatric care is usually given after sentencing.
If a defendant is cured during the term of her sentence, the prison sentence must be completed. 72 Since women with postpartum psychosis are
not a danger to society outside the period of the illness, a GBMI verdict
might constitute an appropriate remedy. Case law, however, shows that
courts usually reject the assertion of GBMI pleas in cases involving infanticidal mothers.
A plea of GBMI led to harsh results for Sharon Comitz, who threw her
73
baby into a stream, causing him to die of exposure or suffocation.
Comitz was sentenced to eight to twenty years in prison because the trial
court found that she was not "severely mentally disabled," 74 despite evidence that she suffered from a history of postpartum depression. The
irony is that the GBMI verdict was designed to help defendants in
Comitz's position; but here, her punishment was equally, if not more,
harsh.
Another example of an unsuccessful attempt at a GBMI verdict is the
recent case against Laura Gambill, an Indiana mother convicted of
drowning her five-year-old son. 75 In this case, the Indiana Supreme
Court upheld a jury verdict that Gambill appreciated the wrongfulness of
the crime, despite contrary evidence from four expert witnesses. 76 The
Indiana Supreme Court also upheld the state constitutionality of the
GBMI verdict, stating: "[t]he 'guilty but mentally ill' verdict serves the
state's interest in securing convictions justly obtained and in obtaining
treatment for those convicted defendants who suffer mental illness."'77 To
70. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.47.030-12.47.050 (Michie 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 401(b) (1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(b)(1)(D) & (2) (1992); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
720, 516-2(c) (1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-36-2-3(4), 35-36-2-5 (West 1986); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 12-110 (1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (1997); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-13-9 (1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3 (Michie 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

18, § 314 (West 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20 (Law Co-op. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 23-A-7-2, 23-A-7-16 (Michie 1985); see also Debra T. Landis, Annotation, "Guilty
But Mentally Ill" Statutes: Validity and Construction, 71 A.L.R. 4th 702, 702-797 (1990);
Kurt M. Bumby, Reviewing the Guilty but Mentally Ill Alternative: A Case of the Blind
"Pleading" the Blind, 21 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 191 (1993).
71. See DRESSLER, supra note 47, at 332. Criticisms of the GBMI alternative include
that it is difficult for a jury to differentiate between mental illness and insanity; it is unnecessary; it fails to ensure that the defendant will receive psychiatric care; and it may lead
juries to compromise by giving GBMI verdicts when not guilty by reason of insanity verdicts are appropriate. See id. at 332-33.
72. See id.
73. See Commonwealth v. Comitz, 530 A.2d 473, 474 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
74. Id.
75. See Gambill v. State, 675 N.E.2d 668 (Ind. 1996); see id. at 670-72 for a factual
account of the crime and an account of Gambill's mental condition.
76. See id. at 672.
77. Id. at 677 (quoting Taylor v. State, 440 N.E.2d 1109, 1112 (Ind. 1982)).
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Gambill, facing a forty-year prison sentence for the conviction, the GBMI
alternative was perhaps no alternative.
C.

DIMINISHED CAPACITY AS A PARTIAL DEFENSE

In addition to the GBMI verdict, diminished capacity 78 is an alternate

plea to insanity, in which a defendant's abnormal mental condition may
mitigate or eliminate culpability. 7 9 In other words, an abnormal mental
condition may negate an element of a charged offense, even though the
condition will constitute a successful insanity defense.80 It is important to
note the difference between insanity and diminished capacity. An insanity finding usually results in commitment of the defendant.8 1 A finding of diminished capacity may result in a not guilty verdict for the
82
charged offense, though a conviction of some lesser offense is possible.
One version of diminished capacity, the mens rea form, negates an element of the crime.8 3 Another version is the true defense theory, which
mitigates murder to manslaughter. 84 The diminished capacity defense automatically mitigates a criminal homicide to manslaughter, but it is only
recognized in a few states and only applies to murder charges.8 5 Because
a diminished capacity defense, in either form, may negate an element of
the infanticidal mother's crime or spare her from life in prison, assertion
of the defense may emerge more frequently in future cases.
The groundwork for using the diminished capacity defense may lie in
the Model Penal Code, which provides that a homicide that would otherwise be murder is manslaughter if it is committed as a result of "extreme
mental or emotional disturbance for which there is no reasonable explanation or excuse."'86 The extreme mental or emotional distress (EMED)
provision has two purposes: "(1) it codifies in expanded form the common law 'sudden heat of passion' doctrine; and (2) it permits, but does
not require, courts in states that adopt the EMED language to recognize
a partial responsibility defense. '8 7 Thus, it is difficult to apply the EMED
provision in the context of diminished capacity. It is also unclear how
many states incorporate such a provision.8 8 Despite the difficulties,
EMED and diminished capacity should not be discounted as possible so78.
partial
79.
80.
81.

The doctrine of diminished capacity is also referred to as diminished responsibility,
responsibility, and partial insanity. See LAFAVE & SCOTF, supra note 61, at 368.
See DRESSLER, supra note 47, at 335.
See id.; see also LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 61, at 368.
See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 61, at 369.

82. See id.
83. See DRESSLER, supra note 47, at 335.

84. See id.
85. See id.
86. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1995).
87. DRESSLER, supra note 47, at 342.

88. See id. At least two states, Oregon and Hawaii, clearly recognize the EMED provision. See id.; see also State v. Counts, 816 P.2d 1157 (Or. 1991); State v. Dumlao, 715
P.2d 822 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986).
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lutions for dealing with infanticidal mothers. 89
D.

POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS AS A DEFENSE

1. Postpartum Disorders Defined
Postpartum depression can be divided into three classes. First, postpartum depression, also known as the "baby blues," is a mild depression and
anxiety condition. In fact, more than two-thirds of all mothers have the
"baby blues," which start about four to five days after childbirth 90 and
last no more than two weeks. 91 The "baby blues" are caused by hormonal changes and psychological factors such as an overwhelming sense of
responsibility or an anticlimax after giving birth.92 A woman suffering
from the "baby blues" may feel misery, mental confusion, crying spells,
94
and irritability.93 The "baby blues" cures itself within two to three days.
Second, severe postpartum depression occurs in ten to fifteen percent
of women and persists for weeks. 95 Symptoms include tiredness, difficulty sleeping, appetite loss, anxiousness, and restlessness. 96 This type of
postpartum depression is more likely to develop in women with strained
relationships, personality disorders, or financial problems; it may also develop in first-time mothers, single parent mothers, or sufferers of anxiety
problem also cures itself or can be cured by anor depression. 97 This
98
tidepressant drugs.
Finally, postpartum psychosis, the rarest and most extreme form of
postpartum depression, can have deadly consequences. Only one in one
thousand new mothers suffering from postpartum depression develop this
psychosis. 99 For every twenty women suffering from postpartum psychosis, one will try to kill herself or her children. 10 0 Serious symptoms of the
psychosis include confusion, agitation, sleep deprivation, hallucinations,
delusions, and bizarre behavior. 10 ' "Since psychosis tends to run in families, its appearance after childbirth probably results from the triggering of
89. For the criticisms surrounding the utilization of the EMED provision, see
DRESSLER, supra note 47, at 342-45. For commentary advocating the use of the EMED

partial defense with homicidal mothers, see Ford, supra note 10, at 531-33, 540-48.
90. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 810
(Charles B. Clayman ed., 1989) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE].
91. See PostpartumDisorders: The Harvard Mental Health Letter, Sept. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9498015 [hereinafter Harvard Letter].
92. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE, supra note 90, at 810.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.; see also Harvard Letter, supra note 91.
97. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE, supra note 90, at 810-11.
98. See id. at 811.
99. See generally Daniel Maier Katkin, Postpartum Psychosis, Infanticide, and Criminal Justice, in POSTPARTUM PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS, A PICTURE PUZZLE (James A. Hamilton & Patricia N. Harberger eds., 1992).
100. See id.
101. See Ronald Sullivan, Jury, Citing Mother's Condition, Absolves Her in Two Babies'
Death, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1988, at 29, col. 2.
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latent emotional conflicts by the stress of the birth.' 02
Other postpartum disorders exist. For example, postpartum panic disorder describes discrete periods of severe anxiety and panic attacks during the period following birth. 10 3 Symptoms include panic attacks,
dependence on others, depression, and obsessional ideas. 10 4 This unusually mild disorder is normally dealt with by the family, rather than with
professional help. 10 5 In fact, "[w]ith correct diagnosis and sensible handling the prognosis is excellent.' u0 6 Another disorder is postpartum obsessive compulsive behavior. 10 7 First documented in 1993, signs include:
obsessive thoughts of harming the baby, depression, fear of being left
alone with the baby, and extreme overprotectiveness of the baby.' 0 8 A
third disorder is Munchausen's syndrome by proxy, a rare psychological
disorder in which a mother is driven to harm her child to gain personal
attention and sympathy.' 0 9 Experts estimate that there are only 250 confirmed cases of Munchausen's syndrome by proxy worldwide." 0
2.

Recognition of Postpartum Disorders by the American Psychiatric
Association

In 1994, for the first time in history, the American Psychiatric Association recognized postpartum onset specified as a mental condition."'
Although given less than a page and one half of coverage in Diagnostic
and Statistical Mental Disorders (DSM IV), the disorder is tied to other
disorders, including Major Depressive, Manic, or Mixed Episode of Major Depressive Disorder, Bipolar I or II Disorder, and Brief Psychotic
Disorder." l2 This condition is only recognized if onset is within four
weeks after delivery of a child. 1 3 The DSM IV specifically ties infanticide to postpartum onset specified, stating "[i]nfanticide is most often as102. ENCYCLOPEDIA

OF MEDICINE,

supra note 90, at 811.

103. See James A. Hamilton et al., The Problem of Terminology, in POSTPARTUM PsyCHIATRIC ILLNESS, A PICTURE PUZZLE (James A. Hamilton & Patricia N. Harberger eds.,
1992); see also A. Metz et al., Postpartum Panic Disorder, 49 J. CUN. PSYCHIATRY 278-79
(1988).
104. See BROCKINGTON, supra note 23, at 158. The disorder is often found in first time
mothers, but it is not limited to them. See id.
105. See id. at 159.
106. Id.
107. See Sara Kirschenbaum & Patricia Webb, More than Blue, MOTHERING, Mar. 22,
1995, at 72.
108. See id.; see also A Question of Health, The Test No Woman Can Afford to Miss,
BOSTON HERALD, June 18, 1993, at 40.
109. See William Miller, Woman Pleads Guilty to Killing Her Infant Son Experts Say
DisorderDrove Her to Harm Children, SPOKESMAN REVIEW, Feb. 18, 1995, at Al. Stephanie Pasicznyk, a Spokane mother who pleaded guilty to second degree murder of her infant, had previously taken her infants to the hospital countless times. See id. Experts
believe that Pasicznyk used her children to gain attention for herself; therefore, she suffered from Munchausen's syndrome by proxy. See id.
110. See id.
111. See

AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL

UAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS

112. See id.
113. See id.

386 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM IV].

MAN-
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sociated with postpartum psychotic episodes that are characterized by
command hallucinations to kill the infant or delusions that the infant is
possessed, but it can also occur in severe postpartum mood episodes with'114
out such specific delusions or hallucinations.
Recognition of a disorder by the American Psychiatric Association and
acceptance by the medical community is often crucial to the acceptance
of a new defense by courts. For example, a New York appellate court
recently upheld a trial court's refusal to allow expert testimony that the
defendant suffered from neonaticide syndrome in People v. Wernick. 115
The Wernick court reasoned that the defendant failed to establish that
neonaticide syndrome is generally accepted in the field of psychiatry and
that it would assist the jury in rendering a verdict." 6 The Wernick court
noted that defense counsel not only failed to request a hearing to determine whether neonaticide is generally accepted in the scientific community, but also opposed such a hearing when the issue was raised by the
People.1 1 7 Thus, a proper hearing on the issue of neonaticidal syndrome
could have led the court to a different conclusion, had the syndrome been
recognized in the DSM IV.
3. Postpartum Psychosis as a Defense
Numerous commentators have argued both for and against the recognition of postpartum psychosis as a separate defense to infanticide." 8 Such
a defense, however, is not novel. As early as the 1950s, courts accepted
evidence of postpartum psychosis to support an insanity defense. 119 In
People v. Skeoch, the Supreme Court of Illinois overturned a defendant's
conviction of murdering her baby because of the prosecution's failure to
prove her sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 120 In Skeoch, expert evi114. Id.

115. 632 N.Y.S.2d 839 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). The court did, however, allow testimony
regarding defendant's claim of insanity. See id. at 840.
116. See id. at 841.
117. See Wernick, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 841.
118. See Anne Damante Brusca, Note, Postpartum Psychosis: A Way Out for Murderous Moms?, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1133, 1168-70 (1990); Lori A. Button, Comment, Postpartum Psychosis: The Birth of a New Defense?, 6 COOLEY L. REV. 323 (1989); Debora K.
Dimino, Comment, PostpartumDepression: A Defense for Mothers Who Kill Their Infants,
30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 231, 265-60, 264 (1990); Christine Ann Gardner, Note, Postpartum Depression Defense: Are Mothers Getting Away With Murder?, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV.
953, 988-89 (1990); Jennifer L. Grossman, Note, Postpartum Psychosis-A Defense to
Criminal Responsibility or Just Another Gimmick?, 67 U. DET. L. REV. 311, 343-44 (1990);
Amy L. Nelson, Comment, PostpartumPsychosis: A New Defense?, 95 DICK. L. REV. 625,
649-50 (1991); Laura E. Reece, Comment, Mothers Who Kill: Postpartum Disorders and
Criminal Infanticide, 38 UCLA L. REV. 699, 754-57 (1991); Barbara E. Rosenberg, Comment, PostpartumPsychosis as a Defense to Infant Murder, 5 Toulto L. REV. 287, 303-07
(1989).
119. See, e.g., State v. Holden, 365 S.E.2d 626, 628 (N.C. 1988); Commonwealth v.
Comitz, 530 A.2d 473, 474-75 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Clark v. Nevada, 588 P.2d 1027, 1029
(Nev. 1979); State v. White, 456 P.2d 797, 798-99 (Idaho 1969); People v. Skeoch, 96 N.E.2d
473 (Ill. 1951). None of these cases, however, questioned the validity of the postpartum
psychosis condition itself.
120. See Skeoch, 96 N.E.2d at 475-76.
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dence regarding Skeoch's suffering of postpartum psychosis was used to
rebut her confession of guilt. 12 1 Specifically, a qualified doctor testified
that Skeoch suffered from postpartum psychosis at the time of the offense, but that she was normal at trial. 122
Postpartum psychosis publicly came to light in the 1988 California case
of Sheryl Massip. Massip allegedly attempted to kill her infant before
finally running over him with her car. 123 After a two month trial, Massip's jury deliberated six and one half days before finding her guilty of
second degree murder.124 Notwithstanding the jury's verdict, the trial
judge found that Massip suffered from postpartum psychosis at the time
of the killing, that her condition met the legal test of insanity, and that
she was therefore not guilty. 125
Postpartum psychosis was also successfully asserted in the case of Ann
Green, a pediatric nurse accused of killing two of her newborn babies and
attempting to kill a third.' 26 Green testified that "she had seen hands she
did not recognize holding pillows over the newborns' faces."'1 2 7 The New
York trial court found Green not guilty by reason of insanity and committed her to a state mental hospital for psychiatric evaluations as an outpatient.128 Other cases, such as that of Michele Remington, 129 have yielded
similar results. The cases of Massip and Green exemplify the success of
postpartum psychosis as a defense. Nevertheless, the defense itself is
often unwelcomed by the trier of fact. Defense attorneys arguing postpartum psychosis, therefore, face the difficult task of proving that a defendant, sane at trial, suffered an uncontrollable condition for a short
time following childbirth.
IV.

DISPARATE SENTENCING IN INFANTICIDE CASES
A.

THE "SLAP ON THE WRIST" CASES

Due to a lack of evidence or inability to prove the mother's state of
mind, some prosecutors decline to bring charges against a mother who
kills her child. Furthermore, judges are known to provide leniency to
121. See id. at 475.
122. See id.
123. See People v. Massip, 271 Cal. Rptr. 868, 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), review granted
and opinion superseded by 798 P.2d 1212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Reece, supra note 118, at
699-700 and accompanying notes; Debra Cassens Moss, Postpartum Psychosis Defense,
A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1988, at 22 (on the day Massip ran over her infant with her car, she heard
voices telling her that her son was the devil).
124. See Massip, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
125. See id.
126. See People v. Green, No. 1273-86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 30, 1988); Sullivan, supra
note 101, at 29.
127. Greene, No. 1273-86; see Sullivan, supra note 10, at 1A. See also Gail Diane Cox,
Postpartum Defense: No Sure Thing, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 5, 1988, at 3; The Dark Side of the
"Baby Blues," N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1988, at C1, col. 1.
128. See Sullivan, supra note 101, at 29.
129. See State v. Remington, No. 587-4-87 BCR (Vt. Dist. Ct. Jan. 26, 1988) (finding
defendant not guilty by reason of insanity because she suffered from postpartum psychosis,
but pursued outpatient therapy).
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mothers found guilty of killing their infants. For instance, Superior Court
Judge George Mitchell infuriated District of Columbia prosecutors by
sentencing Latrena Pixley, who admittedly smothered her baby, to serve
130
156 weekends in jail.
Sometimes a homicidal mother escapes punishment because there is
insufficient evidence that her baby was born alive. This was the case with
Helen Lane, whose newborn baby was found in a garbage bag wrapped in
a monogrammed towel.' 3 ' Despite conclusive evidence that Lane told no
one she was pregnant and placed the baby in the bag after delivery, her
not conclusively be deterconviction was overturned because it could
132
mined whether the baby was born alive.
Other cases exist where homicidal mothers, who are no less guilty than
other mothers who have been sentenced to life imprisonment, basically
receive a slap on the wrist. For instance, Rebecca Guerra, a single
mother who admitted to suffocating her son and was subsequently found
guilty, was sentenced to one year in jail and four years probation. 133 Additionally, cases involving teen-age infanticidal mothers often yield light
sentences.' 3 4 Other cases have resulted in nonpunishment on appeal due
to legal technicalities. For example, in People v. Molina, 3 5 a conviction
was reversed because the jury was not instructed about voluntary and
involuntary manslaughter. This finding occurred despite the fact that
Molina admitted to stabbing her baby to death, was found guilty of second degree murder, and was sentenced to serve up to fifteen years in a
mental hospital. 136 Likewise, in Butler v. Mississippi, the Mississippi
Supreme Court reversed the conviction and subsequent death penalty
130. See Paul Duggan, Leniency Runs Out for Woman Who Killed Baby, Violated Probation, WASH. POST, May 17, 1996, at D1. Judge Mitchell originally sentenced Pixley to
five to 15 years in prison, but suspended the sentence in reliance on arguments by defense
counsel that she suffered from postpartum depression. See id. Pixley later violated parole
by committing credit card fraud, appearing again in Judge Mitchell's court. See id. Judge
Mitchell reinstituted the suspended sentence and sent Pixley to jail. See id.; see also Amy
Koval, Judge Orders Killer Mom Imprisoned, WASH. TIMES, May 17, 1996, at C6. But in
January 1997, Judge Mitchell suspended the remainder of Pixley's sentence, put her on five
years probation, and ordered her to live in a halfway house for the next two years. The
decision has been repeatedly criticized. See, e.g., No Justice for the Dead Baby, WASH.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1997, at C9.
131. See Lane v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 781 (Va. 1978).
132. See id. at 784; see also State v. Doyle, 287 N.W.2d 59 (Neb. 1980) (noting dead
human infant was found on premises of appellant, whom neighbors said looked pregnant
up until the time in question, but evidence was inconclusive as to whether the child was
born alive).
133. See Mother Who Killed Infant Son Given One-Year Jail Sentence, ARIZONA DAILY
STAR, Nov. 28, 1995, at 2B.
134. See, e.g., infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text; but see infra notes 166-86 and
accompanying text (discussing the cases of teenagers Amy Grossberg and Rebecca
Hopfer).
135. People v. Molina, 249 Cal. Rptr. 273, 277 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
136. See id.; see also People v. Lynch, 208 N.W.2d 656 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (overturning conviction of mother guilty of killing her child through malnutrition, and granting a
new trial because the jury was not instructed that voluntary or involuntary manslaughter
could be found).
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sentence of Sabrina Butler because of a prosecution error during trial. 137
B.

ACCEPTANCE OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES TO OBTAIN
LIGHTER SENTENCING

Mitigating circumstances may allow infanticidal mothers to receive
lighter sentences. For example, in the case of Peggy Barsness, who left
her infant unattended all weekend "with the full realization that that
would result in her death, ' 138 the jury returned two guilty verdicts for
second degree intentional murder and second degree culpable negligence
manslaughter. 39 The usual sentence for such a finding is 216 months in
140
prison; however, Barsness's sentence was mitigated to 180 months.
The court cited two factors for the mitigation: (1) mental impairment;
1 41
and (2) "major [postpartum] depression at the time of the offense."'
C.

HARSH SENTENCING MANDATED BY LAW

1. Maximum Sentencing for Murder
When courts refuse to hear defenses and relevant mitigating factors,
the results can be extreme. For instance, in State v. Holden, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina upheld a conviction for the second degree murder of an infant by a seventeen year-old mother.1 42 The trial judge heard
evidence of the defendant's immaturity and limited mental capacity, but
143
found that the aggregating factors outweighed the mitigating factors.
Though her defense factors were stronger than similarly situated mothers
who often receive probation, Holden was sentenced to life
imprisonment.'"
Some states, such as Texas, are especially stringent in their treatment of
murdering mothers. In 1985, nineteen year-old Leanne Marie Pitts

smothered her eight day old son and waited four hours before calling the
137. See Butler v. Mississippi, 608 So. 2d 314 (Miss. 1992); see also infra notes 160-62
and accompanying text.
138. State v. Barsness, 473 N.W.2d 325, 326 (Minn. 1991).
139. See id. at 326-27. Barsness "did not claim mental illness as a defense ... [but] did
seek to introduce evidence of [postpartum] depression and [IQ] as bearing on the issue of
intent." Id. at 326.
140. See id. at 327.
141. Id. Note, however, that the jury can mitigate sentences on its own. In People v.
Wernick, 632 N.Y.S.2d 839 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995), a college student found guilty of killing
her newborn baby in a college dormitory was acquitted by a jury of the more serious
charges of first or second degree manslaughter, and instead was found guilty of criminally
negligent homicide. See Pete Bowles, 6 Years Later, Off to Jail, Sent Away For Killing
Baby, NEWSDAY, Dec. 3, 1996, at A16. Six years after the killing, Wernick is now serving a
one-and-one-third to four-year prison term. See id. See also supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text (concerning the mental conditions defendant Wernick pleaded).
142. See State v. Holden, 365 S.E.2d 626, 631 (N.C. 1988).
143. See id. at 629. In fact, the defendant had the emotional maturity of a twelve or
thirteen year-old, diminished intellectual capacity, a troubled family background, an IQ of
70, and pleaded guilty. See id. at 627-30. A clinical psychologist testified that the "defendant suffered from (1) abused spouse syndrome, (2) [postpartum] depression, (3) borderline
" See id. at 628.
intellectual functioning, and (4) mixed personality disorder ..
144. See id. at 629.
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police. 145 Pitts "was later convicted of murder and sentenced to [sixtythree] years in prison."'1 46 In 1995, Marcie Moon, another Texas mother,
was sentenced to life in prison for suffocating her newborn baby in hopes
of a reconciliation with her husband. 14 7 A less publicized case, yet one
with a similarly rigid outcome, is the case of Olga Torres, who shot and
killed one son and attempted to kill another. 148 Torres's defense attorneys argued that their client was legally insane at the time of the killing.149 The jury returned a verdict of guilty on one count of murder and
one count of attempted murder. 150 Despite evidence of severe depres15
sion, Torres is serving a forty-five year prison sentence. '
2. Recent Invocation of the Death Penalty in Infanticide Cases
152
In February of 1997, in the highly publicized case of Darlie Routier,
a Texas mother adjudged guilty of stabbing her two sons to death in her
home on June 6, 1996, while her husband slept, the court ordered the
ultimate sentence-death by lethal injection. 153 Routier, who continues
to maintain her innocence, claims that an intruder entered the house, fatally stabbed her two young boys, and then wounded her. 54 In deciding
Routier's sentence of lethal injection, jurors unanimously decided that
Routier posed a threat to society and that there was nothing in her background or the circumstances of the crime that warranted sparing her
life.155
Routier was prosecuted under a relatively new Texas statute that
makes it a capital offense to kill a child under the age of six. 15 6 In drafting the new law, the Texas Legislature "cite[d] the need for greater protection for children who were still in the home and too young to have

145. See T.J. Milling, Science Seeks Roots of Infanticide, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 15,
1995, at 37.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. See Liz Stevens, When Mothers Kill: A Troubled South Texas Woman Who Shot
Her Two Sons Grapples With the Aftermath of the Crime and Leaves Society Wondering
"How Can This Happen?," FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Nov. 17, 1996, at 1.
149. See id. Torres's attorneys admitted that they were taking a risk in pleading the
insanity defense since only one percent of all insanity pleas are successful. See id. Furthermore, being adjudged not guilty by reason of insanity does not always allow the defendant to go free in Texas, as many of the "successful" defendants return to a maximumsecurity state facility. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. Like most high profile cases, Routier's face covered newspapers, magazines, and
television screens. Furthermore, a gag order was imposed on those close to the case after
the defendant was indicted by a grand jury. See How the Case Against Darlie Routier
Unfolded, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 2, 1997, at 32A.
153. See Steve Scott, Routier Sentenced to Die, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 5, 1997,
at 1A, 17A.
154. See Steve Scott, Routier Convicted of Murdering Son, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Feb. 2, 1997, at 1A, 32A.
155. See Scott, supra note 153, at 17A.
156. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(8) (Vernon 1998).
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adult contacts who could help them."'1 57 Other states have taken a similar stance' 58 and one state, New Jersey, has even broadened the scope of
such a statute. Specifically, the New Jersey Legislature has invoked eligibility of the death penalty for any murderer convicted of killing a child
159
under fourteen.
Another infanticide case where the death penalty was invoked is that
of Sabrina Butler, a Mississippi mother adjudged guilty of killing her
child and sentenced to death by lethal injection. 160 Rather than the existence of a specific statute making it a capital offense to kill a child under a
certain age, the conviction was premised on a Mississippi statute that
makes the killing of a child "while engaged in the commission of felonious child abuse and/or battery of a child" a capital offense.' 61 Although
the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the verdict based on a prosecution error, 162 it evinces yet another manner in which infanticidal
mothers can be sentenced to die for their crimes.
D.

LACK OF JUVENILE LAWS AS MITIGATION
HOMICIDAL MOTHERS

TooLs

FOR TEENAGE

1. Reasons for and Treatment of Teenage Infanticide
The blame for most teenage infanticide cases stems from the fact that
teenagers rarely feel secure enough to seek help from parents, doctors,
teachers, or available social services. Thus, they often act out of desperation. 163 Infanticide cases exist in situations where the mothers are as
young as fourteen. For instance, in 1987, a fourteen year-old found guilty
of voluntary manslaughter was declared a ward of the court and sentenced to probation. 64 Teenage infanticide cases are scarcely reported
and have historically resulted in the lightest of sentences.
157. Michael Saul & Steve Scott, Prosecutors Prepare to Offer Arguments for Death
Penalty, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 2,1997, at 1A, 30A.

158. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(5) (1995).
159. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 11-3c(4)(k) (West Supp. 1997); see also infra notes 166-79 and
accompanying text (discussing the Amy Grossberg case under New Jersey law).
160. See Butler v. State, 608 So. 2d 314, 315 (Miss. 1992) (reversing lower court conviction because of comments made by the prosecution on defendant's failure to testify).
161. Miss. ANN. STAT. § 97-3-19(2)(f) (West Supp. 1997).
162. See Butler, 608 So. 2d at 318-19. In closing arguments, the prosecutor indirectly
commented on Butler's failure to testify, which clearly violated state and federal constitutional rights not to testify against oneself in a criminal case. See U.S. CONST. amend. V;
Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 26.
163. See Ann Koenig, How Did Two Teen Moms Miss the Safety Net?, LANCASTER NEW
ERA, July 11, 1993, at B1. Within three months in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, two teen
mothers, ages sixteen and seventeen, were charged with murdering their newborn sons.
The killings occurred despite the fact that Lancaster County had numerous programs for
teenage parents. See id.
164. See People v. Sophia M., 234 Cal. Rptr. 698 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). Specifically,
Sophia was ordered to remain in her mother's home, attend school and therapy, and to
complete 100 hours of community service. See id. During the crime, Sophia ripped her
child's umbilical cord with her hands, put the live baby in a shoe box, and abandoned the
box in a field near her school. See id. at 699. Sophia did not assert postpartum depression
as a defense, rather, she relied on her immaturity. See id.
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Today, however, leniency for teens is disappearing in many courts. Instead, teenage mothers are now receiving adult punishments for infanticide crimes.' 65 A recent line of cases, starting with the case of Amy
Grossberg, demonstrates the need for mitigation considerations with
these mothers.
2. Amy Grossberg: A Case Study
A recent Delaware case has once again brought to light the problem of
teenage pressures leading to infanticide. This case is unique in that it
involved both a teenage mother and a teenage father. Amy Grossberg
and Brian Peterson were high school sweethearts who had continued
their relationship almost uninterrupted while at separate colleges in the
Northeast. 166 Both were members of affluent families; they were tal167
ented, likable, successful, and happy kids.
After hiding her pregnancy for nine months, Grossberg allegedly called
Peterson at 12:45 a.m. on November 12, 1996, to tell him she might be in
labor. 168 Peterson then allegedly drove from his college to pick up Grossberg and took her to a motel several hours later.169 After Grossberg gave
birth to a six pound, two-ounce baby boy, they checked out and Peterson
drove Grossberg back to her dorm room without the infant. 170 They allegedly left the newborn baby in a hotel dumpster. 171 Grossberg passed
out the following afternoon and was taken to a hospital where doctors
discovered that she had given birth within the last twelve hours. 172 Police
173
questioned Peterson and he revealed the location of the dead infant.
An autopsy showed that the infant was born healthy, but died from
multiple fractures and from having been shaken.' 74 Grossberg and Peterson were charged with murder, 175 and both pleaded not guilty. 176 Defense theories will likely include that the scared, teenage parents
accidentally crushed the baby's skull during delivery or that the baby was
not born alive. 177 Prosecutors have stated that they will seek the death
165. See People v. Doss, 574 N.E.2d 806 (I11.App. Ct. 1991) (affirming a first degree
murder conviction of a fifteen year-old mother).
166. See Bill Hewitt et al., Mortal Choices Accused of Killing Their Baby, Two Teens
Face Terrible Questions and a Possible Death Penalty, PEOPLE, Dec. 9, 1996, at 62.
167. See Elizabeth Gleick & Elaine Rivera, Three Kids, One Death They Were Happy
and Well-Off Why Did Two Teens Dump Their Baby, Possibly After Crushing Its Skull?,
TIME MAGAZINE, Dec. 2, 1996, at 69.
168. See Marc Peyser, Death in a Dumpster, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 2, 1996, at 92.
169. See id
170. See id
171. See id.
172. See Gleick & Rivera, supra note 167, at 69.
173. See Hewitt et al., supra note 166, at 62.
174. See id.
175. See Gleick & Rivera, supra note 167, at 69.
176. See Rudy Larini, Slaying of Infants FarFrom Unusual,Bergen Suspects Fit Much of
Profile, THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Dec. 30, 1996, at 1.
177. See Peyser, supra note 168, at 92.
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penalty for both parents. 178 Trial has been set for May 4, 1998.179
3.

Rebecca Hopfer: A Case Study

The recent Ohio case of Rebecca Hopfer, a seventeen year-old adjudged guilty of killing her newborn baby after its birth, demonstrates the
conflicting interests between punishing teenagers for the crime of murder
and protecting that same teenager. Like many other neonaticide cases,
Hopfer concealed her pregnancy. She gave birth while alone at home,
wrapped the baby in a towel and placed it in a garbage bag, cleaned up
the bathroom, and threw the baby in the trash. 180 Public debate surrounding the case focused on the irresponsible actions of today's teenagers. "Hopfer's pregnancy was seen alternately as the result of permissive
sexual norms, parental failure to discipline, or inadequate sex education."' 181 Hopfer was initially arraigned in the juvenile court. 182 The ju-3
8
venile court transferred jurisdiction and Hopfer was tried as an adult.'
Hopfer was adjudged guilty of murder and sentenced to fifteen years to
life in prison. 184 Hopfer unsuccessfully pleaded sixteen points of error to
the Ohio Court of Appeals, but her sentence was affirmed. 185 The Ohio
186
Supreme Court refused to hear Hopfer's appeal.
V. MODERN INFANTICIDAL PROBLEMS
A.

ROLE OF SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS

Although no specific profile of an infanticidal mother exist, socioeconomic factors often contribute to the stress in the mother's life. In fact,
"[riates of infant killing have shown a tendency to rise and fall depending
on prevailing economic and social forces."'1 87 It appears that the American welfare system is not equipped to properly handle this burden. "Of
the mothers who kill their children, over half have already come to the
178. See Hewitt et al., supra note 166, at 62. The death penalty is rarely used in cases
involving teenagers, however, so it is likely that prosecutors are pursuing this option in
hopes of striking a plea bargain. See id.
179. See Matthew Futterman, Judge Delays Grossberg Trial Until May '98, New Attorneys in Baby-Killing Case Need Time, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Sept. 4, 1997, at 24.
180. For a complete synopsis of the infant's death, see State v. Hopfer, 679 N.E.2d 321,
328-29 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); see also Oberman, supra note 40, at 27-30.
181. Oberman, supra note 40, at 28. For other emotional arguments surrounding the
case, see Kevin Lamb, Trial Touched on Some Emotional Issues, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
June 23, 1995, at B1.
182. See Hopfer, 679 N.E.2d at 329.
183. See id. The juvenile court found that the safety of the community was at risk if
Hopfer was not incarcerated beyond her twenty-first birthday and that the totality of surrounding circumstances supported a finding that Hopfer was not amenable to treatment.
See id. at 330.
184. See id. at 329; Hopfer refused to plead guilty to a lesser charge that would have
assured her a prison release after two years. See Rob Modic, Hopfer Refused Offer, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 6, 1997, at lB.
185. See Hopfer, 679 N.E.2d at 349.
186. Modic, supra note 184, at lB.
187. Bouillon-Jensen, supra note 22, at 1205.
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Another socioeconomic factor affecting diagnosis of infanticidal
mothers involves insurance companies. In a modern society where insurance companies are pressuring doctors to send new mothers home expediently, new mothers with postpartum depression are perhaps escaping
diagnosis. This undiagnosed depression can lead to psychosis and eventually infanticide. Fortunately, state legislatures across the country are approving measures requiring insurance companies to provide at least fortyeight hours of coverage for new mothers, 189 perhaps saving many infants'
lives nationwide. But mothers who are committed to mental hospitals are
sometimes released too early under pressure from the insurance companies. Consequently, infanticide can still occur despite treatment, and hospitals often escape liability. 190
B.

MISDIAGNOSIS OF INFANT MURDER WITH SUDDEN INFANT DEATH
SYNDROME

(SIDS)

An alarming fact in the tragedy of infanticide is that the crime often
goes unnoticed because the deaths are frequently confused with sudden
infant death syndrome (SIDS). SIDS is a mysterious illness that strikes
babies without warning, causing them to stop breathing and die.' 9 ' One
problem with diagnosis is that doctors must rely on partial testimony
from parents who describe their children as suffering "spells in which they
suddenly [stop] breathing and [turn] blue."'1 92
Based primarily on a 1972 report by Dr. Alfred Steinschneider, both
the medical profession and the public came to accept the belief that apnea monitors prevent SIDS. 193 Dr. Steinschneider's paper sparked the
belief that SIDS could run in families and that it was relatively common. 94 In fact, Steinschneider's 1972 report has provided ammunition
for defense attorneys and has hampered prosecutors for the past twenty
years. 195 Nobody knows how many cases of serial infanticide were over188. Eve Zibart, The Medea Syndrome: Women Who Murder Their Young, COSMOPOLITAN,

Aug. 1, 1996, at 176.

189. See Julie Forster, Moms' Wails Prevail;Nine States OK Laws Extending Maternity
Stays, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Apr. 18, 1996, at 2013.
190. See Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 529 N.E.2d 449 (Ohio 1988) (holding that
the treating doctor and hospital were not liable for releasing mother, a patient in the
mental ward, who later killed her infant).
191. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE, supra note 90, at 952.
192. Charles B. Hickey et al., SIDS Researcher Sidestepped Critics: Medical Records
Don't Support Dr. Alfred Steinschneider's Claim That Waneta Hoyt's Babies Suffered Severe Breathing Problems in the Hospital, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse N.Y.), May 6, 1996, at
Al.
193. See Alfred Steinschneider, Prolonged Apnea and the Sudden Infant Death Syndrome: Clinical Laboratory Observations, 50 PEDIATRICS 646 (1972).
194. See Hickey et al., supra note 192.
195. See Todd Lighty et al., Upstate Study of SIDS Hides Homicides, Research Suggesting SIDS Runs in Families Derailedthe Investigation of Six ChicagoArea Infant Homicides, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, NY), May 7, 1996, at Al.
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looked during the nearly two decades Steinschneider's ideas were widely
accepted.
Steinschneider's report, once heavily relied upon, has now been called
into question throughout the medical profession. 196 Criticism first surfaced when the subjects of Dr. Steinschneider's report, five children in a
single family who allegedly died of SIDS after they suddenly stopped
breathing, 197 were actually found to have been murdered. The infanticidal mother in Dr. Steinschneiders's report, a New York woman named
Waneta Hoyt, confessed to the killings twenty years after the last of the
dead infants was laid to rest. 198 At the time of the deaths, no foul play
was suspected and medical inquiries never focused on the possibility of
homicide. 199 This significant oversight occurred despite nurses' concerns
that the babies only suffered life threatening spells when at home with
their mother.20 0 After twenty years of freedom from suspicion, Hoyt was
of murder and is currently serving seventy-five
found guilty of five counts
20
years to life in prison. '
Like Hoyt, Marybeth Tinning is a serial infanticidal mother who also
avoided detection for years. Although suspected of killing seven of her
eight children, Tinning has only been convicted of killing the last. 20 2 The
fact that one of Tinning's children was adopted undermines the theory
that the children somehow carried a "death gene" that predisposed them
to SIDS.2 0 3 Doctors and others were suspicious as to the causes of the
children's deaths, but it was not until the ninth child died that Tinning
was accused of infanticide. 2 4 A jury found Tinning guilty of depraved
indifference murder. Tinning is now serving a prison sentence of twenty
2 05
years to life.
Unfortunately, the cases of Hoyt and Tinning are not isolated from
196. For instance, Dallas forensic pathologist Dr. Linda Norton has stated, "[a]s long as
you have this bogus thing hanging out there where you've got medical literature showing
that SIDS runs in some families, you get these prosecutors who don't even like to attempt
to try them." See id.
197. See Steinschneider, supra note 193.
198. See Lighty et al., supra note 195, at Al.
199. See People v. Hoyt, 620 N.Y.S.2d 520, 521 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). Each of Hoyt's
children died as infants between 1965 and 1971, but it was not until 1992 that their deaths
were treated as possible homicides and investigation began. See id. at 520 n.1.
200. See Lighty et al., supra note 195.
201. See id.
202. Elizabeth Rhodes, Killing Her Own, The Case of Marybeth Tinning May Focus
More Attention on a Taboo Subject: Infanticide, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 25, 1989, at B1.
Tinning's first child unquestionably died of meningitis. The other eight children died of
more suspicious causes. Their official causes of death include the following: Joseph and
Barbara, Reye's syndrome; Timothy and Mary Frances, SIDS; Nathan, acute pulmonary
edema; Jonathan, cardiopulmonary arrest, cause unknown; Michael, viral pneumonia
(later disputed because doctors said his condition was too mild to be fatal); and Tami
Lynne, suffocation. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See People v. Tinning, 536 N.Y.S.2d 193, 194 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). At trial, Tinning's statement about the deaths of her last three children were admissible. She stated, "I
smothered each with a pillow because I'm not a good mother." Id. at 195.
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other cases of infanticide. 20 6 In 1994, a twenty-three year-old Houston
woman confessed to killing three of her children, but only after she was
charged with attempting to strangle the fourth. 20 7 It often is not until an
infant can conclusively be said to have died of infanticide that the previ20 8 It must
ous deaths of infants of the same mothers are investigated.
finally be noted that even an isolated infant homicide by one mother, who
has other healthy children, can be misdiagnosed as SIDS. There is no
requirement that the mother partake in serial infanticide. Most recently,
Dr. Thomas Truman, a former research fellow at Massachusetts General
Hospital, announced a finding of evidence in that hospital's records that
dozens of cases of SIDS, involving dozens of mothers, may have actually
been cases of infanticide. 20 9 Such research assuredly will spark further
debate on SIDS and misdiagnosed homicides.
C.

CULTURAL EFFEcTs ON INFANTICIDE

As noted earlier, various countries and cultures treat the killing of infants and children by their mothers differently. Some underdeveloped
nations even condone the killing as a means of birth control or a parental
choice to choose the healthiest, most promising offspring. 210 The United
Nations estimates that hundreds of thousands of baby girls are disposed
of every year in China.211 In other countries, children under age one are
206. Like the Hoyt case, the deaths of five children in the family of Deborah Gedzius
are detailed in medical literature. Dr. Eugene Diamond outlined how all five children had
apnea, thus all died of SIDS between the ages of six weeks and two years. After the publication, a sixth child died at ten weeks. See Lighty et al., supra note 195, at Al. Ironically,
neither the Chicago police nor the Cook County medical examiner took a closer look at
the unusual series of child deaths until Gedzius's 33 year-old husband was found dead. See
id. After reviewing records, Dr. Mary Jumbelic, assistant medical examiner in Chicago,
concluded that all six children were homicide victims. See id. Still faced with
Steinschneider's research and failure to obtain a confession, prosecutors closed the investigation. See id. The fuming uncle of the three murdered children called Steinschneider's
1972 paper a "license to kill." See id. For an interesting summary of historical serial infanticide cases, see BROCKINOTON, supra note 23, at 435-36.
207. See Young Mother Admits Killing Three Infants, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,

Sept. 23, 1995, available in 1995 WL 9503183. Though the woman, Claudette Kibble was
suspected in the deaths of the infants, nothing could be proven until her confession. See id.
208. See Virgil Tipton, Area Has Instances of Mothers Killing Children,ST. Louis POSTDISPATCH, Nov. 5, 1994, at 6A. It was not until Tammy Corbett's third child died of suffocation that authorities investigated the earlier deaths of two of her infants. Corbett is now
serving a life sentence for the murders. See id. Paula Sims told authorities that her second
infant had been abducted and killed in the same way as she said her first child had a year
before. She later admitted to smothering both infants. Sims is serving life without parole
after pleading guilty to both murders. She blamed the murders on postpartum depression.
See id.
209. See Richard A. Knox, Suspicions Surface in Cases Termed "Sudden Infant Death,"
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 9, 1997, at Al. Specifically, the report indicates that as many as 56
out of 156 cases of "near-miss" asphyxiation among infant patients at Massachusetts General Hospital may have involved parental abuse. See id.
210. See HAUSFATER & HRDY, supra note 14, at 461.
211. See Zibart, supra note 188. Even today, evidence exists in China that family planning policies have resulted in a practice of killing female infants; census data indicates that
as many as 600,000 female infants have been killed in one year. See Where Have All The
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murdered at a rate four times the rest of the population.21 2 Recently, two
major cases demonstrating the cultural differences between England, the
United States, and Japan surfaced.
First, the cultural differences in treatment of infanticide between England and the United States publicly came to light in the case of Carolyn
Beale. Beale, a British woman on vacation in the United States, was accused of suffocating her newborn baby and trying to smuggle the baby
past airport security in New York. 213 Asserting a psychological defense,
Beale said she could not remember the thirty hours between the birth of
the infant and her arrest.2 14 After serving seventeen months in a U.S.
prison, Beale returned to a hospital in England to undergo a year of
treatment. 21 5 One striking point of this case is that if Beale had suffocated her child in England, rather than in the United States, she would
have avoided prison time. "Instead, under Great Britain's Infanticide
Act, she probably would have been hospitalized immediately for a comprehensive psychiatric examination, and then would have pleaded guilty
21 6
to manslaughter and have been hospitalized for psychiatric treatment.
In the United Kingdom and other countries in Western Europe, murderous mothers, suffering from depression, are presumed ill.217 No such presumption exists in the United States. In fact, a charge analogous to
second-degree murder, depending on the
Beale's could even constitute
218
particular jurisdiction.
Differences between the treatment of mothers in the U.S. and Japan
also recently emerged with the Michigan case of Itsumi Koga. Koga, according to police, threw her newborn son in a pond near her apart22 0
ment.2 19 Koga stood trial in the United States for first degree murder.
Little Girls Gone? In Rural China No One Knows, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,
June 18, 1991, at n.1, col. 2.
212. See Zibart, supra note 188. These countries are Great Britain, Japan, Germany,
France, and the Scandinavian countries. See id.
213. See JoJo Moyes, Mother May Not Face Murder Trial, INDEPENDENT (London),
May 19, 1995, at 6. Experts determined that Beale was suffering from existing clinical
depression as well as postpartum depression at the time of the murder. See id.
214. See id.
215. See Beth Holland, 2 Lands, 2 Laws On Baby Murders/British Courts More Tolerant
Than U.S., NEWSDAY, Mar. 10, 1996, at A34.
216. Id. (quoting Michael Dowd, Beale's Manhattan attorney).
217. See id. Under England's Infanticide Act, this presumption of illness makes manslaughter the top penalty for infanticide. Michael Dowd, a Manhattan attorney, said,
"There hasn't been a custodial sentence in England in 50 years." Id. For example, in
December 1996, a twenty-two year-old florist smothered her newborn and hid his body in a
freezer for weeks. See Gale Scott, Experts say 'Prom Mom' Type Cases Are not a New
Occurrence, STAR LEDGER (Newark, NJ), Sept. 21, 1997, at 48. The mother agreed to get
psychiatric help and received a suspended sentence. See id.
218. See Holland, supra note 215 (quoting Dowd: "We're called the leader of the free
wold; we can't do this? I think the law in the United States doesn't take into consideration the realities that we understand now about psychiatric illnesses during pregnancy ...I
think in this case the UK [United Kingdom] is ahead of us.").
219. See Doug Durfee & Ron French, Murder Trial Jars Local Japanese, DETROIT
NEWS, July 21, 1996, at B1.
220. See Ron French, In Oakland County: Lawyers for Mother Reject Plea Offer, DETorr NEWS, July 31, 1996, at D3.
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Koga's sentence included seven months in a state mental hospital and five
years probation for involuntary manslaughter. 221 The Japanese community expressed outrage over the handling of the case. In Japan, Koga
would not have stood trial or faced punishment; instead, she would have
been ordered to stay at her parents' house to recover. 222 Moreover, the
tragedy could have been altogether avoided if Koga had given birth in
Japan. Under Japanese traditions, Koga's mother would have cared for
her for a month following the birth. 223
VI.

EVALUATION OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO ASSIST
SUFFERING, INFANTICIDAL MOTHERS

"There is something wrong with a system of justice [that] charges a
mother suffering from [postpartum] depression ...with the same degree
of culpability in a homicide as a thug who mows down a store owner
deliberately in a robbery. ' 224 It is unfair that a scared teenager can face
the death penalty for neonaticide in one state for the same crime, but an
adult may get just a slap on the wrist in another state. Of course, disparate outcomes are to be expected from different juries, but this Comment
has noted judges, such as those in the Pixley and Massip cases, who have
ignored the juries' findings. 225 Perhaps judges are making such drastic
moves because the law provides few alternatives. These cases are rarely
appealed, so precedent is lacking. Moreover, legislation on infanticide is
virtually nonexistent.
A rational basis for the disparate treatment of homicidal mothers does
not exist. The wide and disparate range of penalties for convicted homicidal mothers, however, could stem from the division in the psychiatric
community about postpartum disorders and the emotional outrage when
an infant is killed at the hands of its mother. Nevertheless, there is a
likely pattern of treatment in factually similar cases. For example, the
following are most likely to be found insane: women who claim to have
heard voices; women who attempt suicide after committing murder; and
serial infanti~idal mothers. 226 To the contrary, women who fabricate misleading stories regarding the whereabouts of their babies bear a stranger
likelihood of receiving long terms of incarceration. 227
221. See Japanese Mother Sent to Mental Hospital For Killing Infant, DEUTSCHE
Oct. 10, 1996.
222. See French, supra note 220.
223. See Laura Berman, Translatinga Tragedy: Interpreter Serves as a Bridge Between
East and West in Infanticide Trial, DETROrr NEWS, Sept. 2, 1996, at D1.
224. Pete Waldmeir, Judge Criticizes System's Handling of Koga Case, DETROIT NEWS,
Aug. 4, 1996, at B1 (quoting United States District Judge Avern Cohn in publicly criticizing
the prosecutor in the Itsumi Koga case for charging the mother with first-degree murder);
see supra notes 219-223 and accompanying text discussing the Koga case.
225. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing judicial actions in the Pixley
case); supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing judicial action in the Massip case).
226. See Maier Katkin, supra note 99, at 279.
227. See id.
PRESSE-AGENTUR,
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According to Daniel Maier-Katkin, "[t]he challenge facing American
jurisdictions is to establish a rationale for more humane treatment of a
group of offenders whose emotional condition can be characterized as
troubled, whose misbehavior borders on self-destructiveness, and for
whom the traditional legal values of deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation are of questionable appropriateness. ''2 28 State legislatures are undoubtedly hesitant to create laws that include postpartum psychosis as a
separate defense when the medical profession is producing incomplete
studies on the disorder. Recognition of postpartum psychosis in the
DSM-IV, however, is a much needed first step toward legislation. Because such laws are in all likelihood years away, it is necessary to evaluate
what is currently being done to provide adequate sentencing for these
mothers and the rationales for those sentences.
A. POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSis DEFENSE
The most positive aspect of a postpartum psychosis defense is that it
offers a just legal option for a woman who truly suffered from the disorder at the time of the killing. Furthermore, a separate postpartum psychosis defense would promote uniformity in decisions and sentencing for
mothers suffering from the affliction.
There are also ample negative aspects to recognizing postpartum psychosis or severe depression as a separate defense because it creates a slippery slope to finding culpability. For instance, pre-menstrual syndrome,
post-traumatic stress disorder, and addictive gambling would also arguably merit a separate defense under this reasoning. Moreover, other conditions could also be asserted as a defense, including depression, suffering
from divorce, death in the family, physical illness, or even post-birth
stress on fathers. Accepting postpartum psychosis as a defense to infanticide also invites arguments to extend the defense to other crimes. For
instance, a woman who had recently given birth could argue that postpartum psychosis caused her to rob a bank, commit fraud, or even murder an
adult. The defense could be a way for new mothers to escape culpability
for crimes even if a recent birth is merely coincidental. A final negative
argument is that such a defense discriminates against men, who cannot
bear children but suffer equally the effects of post-birth stress.
Postpartum psychosis as a factor in mitigating sentencing is a compromise, but it too suffers from the same arguments against recognizing postpartum psychosis as a defense. It creates a slippery slope for mitigating
factors, unfairly favors women, and offers an escape from harsher punishment. But, if a murdering mother's mental impairment does not rise to
the level of insanity, the jury should at least hear evidence of postpartum
psychosis as a way to lessen sentencing under statutory guidelines. Under
this view, a mother afflicted with postpartum psychosis who murders her
228. Id. at 280.
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child can be sentenced to receive mental help rather than continual
mental suffering behind bars.
B.

THE USE OF INSANITY ARGUMENTS

The insanity defense, when factually applicable, is the legal argument
for an infanticidal mother who is found to be insane at the time of her
infant's murder. The problem is that when different jurisdictions use different tests, different results occur. This disparity leads to inconsistent
judicial outcomes throughout the country. A mother may be legally insane at the time of the murder under one state's definition, but may not
be in another. The problems with the insanity defense, however, are no
different from problems in application of the insanity defense in other
areas of the law. Despite these problems, if an infanticidal mother's conduct rises to the level of insanity, her conduct will be excused by law and
she will be rehabilitated rather than incarcerated. For this reason, insanity has proven successful as a defense for infanticidal mothers in the
past, and in the absence of alternative defenses, will continue in the
future.
C.

DIMINISHED CAPACITY AS A PARTIAL DEFENSE

As a partial defense, diminished capacity is often underutilized in the
area of infanticide. Under such a partial defense, postpartum psychosis
or EMED could be asserted. Although unavailable in most jurisdictions,
diminished capacity as a partial defense provides a worthwhile argument
for infanticidal mothers. When the infanticidal mother's conduct falls
short of insanity, even though she demonstrated symptoms of insanity,
diminished capacity could be invoked to lessen a murder charge to manslaughter. A manslaughter charge provides a lesser sentence, and therefore, more hope of rehabilitating the infanticidal mother's condition.
More important, however, the idea of diminished capacity provides jurors
and judges with a medium somewhere between guilt and total innocence
of the crime.
D. EDUCATION: AN UNCONTROVERSIAL SOLUTION
Finally, educating the public about postpartum disorders is an uncontroversial solution. The general public, and ultimately jurors, have little-if any-knowledge of what these disorders entail and are therefore
unable to weigh expert testimony properly. Education is also a key to
prevention of infanticide. In a world in which mothers are sent home
from the hospital in a matter of days, family members must be able to
recognize signs that a mother may be suffering from a post-birth malady.
These suffering women must be identified and helped in order to avoid
tragedy.
We are failing as a society to educate citizens, especially women, about
the options for dealing with an unwanted pregnancy. More specifically,
we are failing to prevent tragedies by teenage mothers like Amy Gross-
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berg. Pregnant teenagers today, as well as adults, have more options than
ever before to deal with unwanted pregnancies. Unfortunately, many
teenagers fail to use these resources and kill their babies at birth simply
from fear and ignorance of the other options available to them. As a
society, we arguably bear a responsibility to educate and counsel these
teens.
VII. CONCLUSION
Often unbelievable, and usually inexcusable, infanticide in America is a
crime that refuses to go away. Whether it is a high profile case such as
the recent Grossberg case in Delaware, or a baby killed immediately after
birth and never missed or reported, infanticide is murder. Infanticidal
mothers have faced and continue to face, inconsistent and disparate treatment. The same murder by the same mother could receive different
treatment depending on the jurisdiction's laws, particular jury, or even
the beliefs of a particular judge. Due to the inconsistency of judicial outcomes and the absence of legislative guidelines, a mother found guilty of
infanticide today might as well flip a coin to predict her punishment.
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